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ON NOT BEING ASHAMED OF THE GOSPEL: 
PARTICULARITY, PLURALISM, AND VALIDATION 
John Howard Yoder 
A standard account of the problem of validation considers intelligibility and 
identity as incompatible alternatives in a zero-sum context. The more the 
identity of a community or a set of ideas is specifiably or particularly Chris-
tian, the less capable, it is held, is that community or that set of ideas of 
communication to others. If on the other hand ideas are so formulated as to 
be communicable to others, they have less to say that the hearers do not 
already know. This paper argues that said disjunction is refuted by the concept 
and by the track record of Gospel; it is a genre of communication which is 
at once particular and communicable, by virtue of the communicators' unco-
erced and noncoercive submission to the host culture. 
From prehistoric tribal cultures to the age of the early classic philosophers, 
our modern notion of transtribal "validation" would not have been pertinent. The 
truth which any presocratic sage exposited was that of his own community. Argu-
ment, proverbs, epic, drama celebrated the values underlying one's own language, 
one's own mores and social structures. There was no other place to stand. 
When travel and social change challenged the self-evident quality of a 
given community's norms, there were a few logically possible recourses. 
Classical thinkers tried them. One recourse is to analyze language. We define 
"justice" by disengaging socratically what we mean by calling a man "just". 
That opens up a set of possible paths, of which one is Plato's vision of pure 
ideas. The "validity" of the "ideas" is invulnerable, behind the mental distil-
lation process which separates them from only relative "appearances." 
The other end of the scale of "linguistic" answers shades from the sophists 
to the cynics. These scoffers show Plato and Aristotle how arbitrary are the 
definitions they claim to find deep in the language. They play with the 
malleability of language. They demonstrate the various prices to be paid for 
the diminishing reliability of our claim that our concepts can be unpacked by 
simply analyzing our usage, so as to provide adequate instruments of shared 
discernment and accountability. 
Both ends of the scale from Platonism to cynicism are still unself-critically 
language-dependent and community-dependent. Plato's distillation process took 
off from a monolingual culture. Every "idea" disengaged by socratic questioning 
is borne by a word, assumed to be univocal, so that its meaning can meaningfully 
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be pursued, in particular language. The socratic questioner assumes that under 
proper prodding the word will yield an univocal definition. The socratic inves-
tigation of "what we mean by calling a man 'just''' has to presuppose, without 
being self-conscious about it, a particular language located in a particular culture. 
Even the cynics go on living and debating within the linguistic culture whose 
transcendent pretensions they have undercut. Once the culture's monolithic 
self-confidence is undermined, none of those arguments work. l 
If the simplest way to describe the conditions for an univocal language is 
to describe the monolingual village, then the shape of the challenge to self-
evident univocality is most adequately modeled by the young person's leaving 
home for the distant city. It is in terms of personal cultural development that 
one can best seek to interpret the embarrassment of particularity, which drives 
people to seek validation beyond themselves.2 The child moving from the 
family to the public school, the student discovering the classics, any person 
first learning a foreign language makes the same discovery. The fundamental-
ist discovering that the Bible can be read as one reads any other literature, 
or as history, does it in another way. The counselee experiencing the 
psychiatrist's capacity to find threatening garbage in his or her own subcon-
scious will in yet another way surrender to the sovereignty of the wider world. 
The syndrome is regular, even though that wider world is each time just one 
more subculture. Some of the "wider worlds," in fact, though they overpower 
the person entering them, are narrower in terms of the agenda they handle, 
or smaller in terms of the number of people they speak for, than was the 
provincial culture from which a person came. 
The youth discovering a wider world tends to assume that since that par-
ticular world had not been there in that particular shape thirty or 100 years 
before, therefore the foundation-shaking, liberating encounter with a new set 
of doubts and certainties, which he/she has just gone through, is an unprec-
edented experience. It matters that we be reminded that in its shape, though 
not in its substance, the experience is perennial. There is always a wider world 
claiming that its truths are self-evident. As we shall see, that was the case in 
the first century. It is not a new contribution of "modernity". 
The search for foundations, the urge to find some argument, some mental 
move, some court of appeal beyond appeal, is thus a learned personal psychic 
defense against the constantly repeated experience of being overpowered by 
a wider world. It is psychologically natural, but by the nature of things it is 
insatiable and logically unrealistic. 
The psychological and sociological momentum which makes the respec-
tively "wider world" more convincing is not derived from rational demonstra-
tions (where would one stand to deliver them?) but from the social experience 
of growth or migration from the world of one's past toward the wider, or more 
accepting, or more complex, or more tolerant, or more decisive, or wealthier 
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world into which one has moved. Narrowness is associated with parental 
authority; breadth with the teacher who has liberated one therefrom. 
Behind all of these maneuvers there is the fear of vulnerability, a cringing 
before the danger that we may be told by an audience in that wider world 
that they do not believe us. We want what we say not only to be understand-
able, credible, meaningful. ... We want people to have to believe us. We 
hanker for patterns of argument which will not be subject to reasonable doubt. 
We are impressed by the power to convince which we see exercised by 
demonstrations in mathematics and logic, in the natural sciences, and in 
documented history ... and we want our claims about God or morality to be 
similarly coercive. We think that truth must somehow be made irresistible, 
because that is the way in which the small world in which we grew up taught 
us what the rules are, and that is how the larger world we since moved into 
imposed itself on us. We become "apologetic," ready to decrease the vigor 
of our claims, if that will decrease their vulnerability to rejection. 
To say it another way, the hunger for validation is a hunger for power. We 
want people to have to believe what we say. We therefore seek to learn from 
them what the warrants would be to which they would yield. Yet if in so 
doing we ratify the truth criteria they already hold, what have we then to tell 
them? Or if we articulate our claims in the language of a world they do not 
inhabit, why should they listen? The more honestly we face up to the fact of 
diversity between cultures, the more frankly we acknowledge change and 
conflict within our own, the deeper becomes the embarrassment of particu-
larity, and the farther out range the searches for "foundations". 
It would be demanding but perhaps fruitful exercise to seek to itemize all the 
possible "apologetic" modes of approximation to transtribal "validation" there 
might be. Here I shall limit myself, after this amateur preface, to elucidating one 
specific alternative stance, whose shape seems to me to be different from the 
others at one point. To do so I propose to walk through a thin sampling of the 
recent inhouse conversation, among persons doing historical an moral theol-
ogy in a Christian setting,3 as that conversation bears upon the notion of 
validating particular meanings, and sets the scene for the alternative I propose. 
George Lindbeck's work The Nature of Doctrine4 has been recognized as 
a strong statement of one possible answer. He tells us that "doctrine" articu-
lates, from within a community's acceptance of is own identity, the coherence 
with which that community assumes and continues its own history. "Doctrine" 
thus understood has more to say than what Lindbeck calls "expressivism"; it 
makes verifiable statements based on more than "attitude." But it renounces 
claims to describe "the way things really are" in a way that would transcend 
community-dependency, or that could negate a priori the contradictory read-
ings of observers in some quite different society. This acceptance of one's 
own limits may be read as not facing the challenge of universality. 
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James Gustafson does read it that way. He attacks the matter directly in a 
recent paper.s He criticizes a number of contemporary writers, of whom 
Lindbeck is guilty of being the most clear. Gustafson describes theological 
knowledge as a null-sum game in which we must choose between authenticity 
and intelligibility, and Lindbeck has made the wrong choice. So have the 
"narrative theologians". 
To these particularists, whom he calls "sectarian," Gustafson ascribes so-
ciological, philosophical, and theological shortcomings. He does not (in this 
paper) elucidate these reproaches in depth on the basis of any documented 
analysis of what these authors have all written. He rather deduces the re-
proaches a priori from the above-stated null-sum disjunction, even though at 
the end of his paper he grants that the disjunction is "too simple." 
Gustafson had made almost the same point four years earlier, quoting 
approvingly an old statement of Alasdair MacIntyre: "Either [moral theology] 
will remain within the theological closed circle: in which case it will have 
no access to the public and shared moral criteria of our society. Or it will 
accept those criteria: in which case it may well have important things to say, 
but these will not be distinctively Christian."6 
Gustafson does not elaborate on what might in his view count as solid 
criteria to verify or falsify "intelligibility". We must gather from his silence that 
he assumes they are self-evidently abroad in the university and in popular lay 
culture.7 
There are good reasons to take as representative this statement of our issue. 
Gustafson has stated the argument simply and starkly, in prominent places. 
He has done it in the realm of ethics, and (once, although only glancingly8) 
he has named me as representing it for him. That does not mean that either 
Gustafson or I would consider him to have invented the problem. He assumes 
that it is a classical difficulty. 
Gustafson thereby joins the line of academic apologetes since 
Schleiermacher, who believe that there is in the world around us just one 
"public" and commonly accessible meaning system, and that it will be of 
service, both to the Christian tradition and to contemporary doubters, that we 
restate the former in such a way as to make sense to the latter. 
In so doing he has implemented, without recognizing that it might need to 
be argued,9 the standard epistemological context of establishmentlO : 
1) There is assumed to be "out there" a singly publicly accessible system for 
validating statements of fact as being (at least) meaningful and (perhaps, 
idea 11 y) as "true". 
2) It is further assumed that that system can also validate statements about 
value or morality. Accepting the demands of that system is a prerequisite 
for what Mcintyre (1963) had called, with Gustafson's approval, having 
"important things to say." 
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3) It is further assumed that in any given setting it is possible to ascertain 
by empirical readings, whether scientific or impressionistic, what that 
normative public meaning framework is. For the Gustafson of ETP it is a 
cosmology dominated by the natural sciences and a culture just now 
coming to be concerned about the ecological crisis. He appears to believe 
that in this magnum opus he has resolved the challenge of particularity in 
an original way, one which especially befits our present cultural challenge. 
To critique that claim or that book is not my theme here. II 
4) By definition the notion of "public and shared criteria" is a true platitude, 
self-validated if trusted by everyone, and self-defeating if questioned by 
anyone. Thereby it partakes of the same self-confident ambivalence which 
regularly marks appeals to "nature," "self-evidence," and "consensus." 
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The above sampling should suffice to characterize the dominant debate 
about the ability to communicate to or be validated by "the wider world," 
and to illustrate the limits of the debate. I suggest that the standard polar 
account is not merely caricatured, and exaggerated, but illogical. In ordinary 
rationality, intelligibility and authenticity condition each other mutually. 
They are not alternatives which one could choose between. More important 
for my present concern, that statement of the issue omits one important, quite 
different option. The suggestion I propose to elucidate here is that the notion 
of "Evangel" or "Good News" represents a specific perspective on the prob-
lem of particularity, one to which the standard surveys of methodological 
spectra have not attended. I propose to call that other option "evangelical," 
but with the recognition that my use of that widely-abused adjective will need 
to be specified. 
I should note one prefatory claim on the formal level, common knowledge 
to philosophers yet still needing to be said in the milieu where this review 
began. It is that the search to avoid particularity by some mental move of 
definition or some kind of empirical data-gathering is by the nature of things 
a wasted effort. It cannot be done, whether we analyze the challenges with 
psychological, sociological, or linguistic tools. There is no non-particular 
place to stand. Any claim to have access to a kind of truth which is by 
definition the same for everyone is epistemologically pre-modern. 12 The the-
ory of truth exemplified by and assumed ever since Lessing, which can claim 
to put the "particularity" of others in a box only because it thinks that its own 
"necessary truths of reason" are universal, is in fact no less in a box itself. 
This does not mean that the games people engage in, in the course of the 
effort to correct for bias or to make sense to others, are pointless. Constructs 
like "viewing from nowhere" or "ideal observers" can be of some use for 
some internal self-critical purposes, as long as their fictional status is kept in 
mind. What they cannot do is guarantee that someone else in particular ought 
to believe me. 
Yet the desire for some kind of transtribal validation cannot be wrong. It 
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testifies to respect for those to whom one wishes to communicate. It testifies 
to the strength of anyone's conviction that what one believes (even though 
all such belief has been arrived at historically, in one's own setting and 
language) is not only true only for oneself. 
We need therefore to reconstruct the nature of particularity as a truth chal-
lenge. We must abandon the chhnerical vision of a set of semantic or defini-
tional moves which would transcend the limits of one's own identity, 
rationally coercing assent, without taking account of a particular interlocutor 
or a specific dialogical setting. We must relinquish the dream of a set of social 
moves which would find or construct a "world" so big as to enclose everyone 
else. 13 
Yet we must not abandon the claim that the validity of what we believe is 
founded on grounds more solid than whim, flipping a coin, accident, or 
provincial bias. Instead of seeking to escape particular identity, what we need, 
then, is a better way to restate the meaning of a truth claim from within 
particular identity. 
The word with which the early Christians did that was Evangel, "Good 
News." To unfold the implications of this term 14 will demonstrate the inade-
quacy of the polar formulation of the problem with which we began. IS 
The word "news" refers to a kind of information which originates in a 
particular setting. It is without embarrassment contingent, historical. (It is 
often narrative, too, but to make much of that as a special additional issue in 
our contemporary discussion would be a red herring.) Others need to know 
about it, but they will know about it only if told by persons who themselves 
were witnesses to the event, or who had learned about it before by being told. 
The only information which is not thus received from a witness is the utterly 
particular new insight which an individual comes up with, however that might 
happen (dream? vision? audition? hallucination? intuition?), and that too is 
news when the next person hears it. 
Next, "news" refers to information which is communicable. It does in fact 
get communicated to someone else. There is no more public act than to 
announce good news. By the nature of the case news is not esoteric or exotic. 
It can be communicated in the language of any addressee. It is here that 
Gustafson's pejorative descriptions, according to which any theology which 
avows its particularity "becomes incorrigible," "marginalized," or "sectar-
ian," or his use of the nouns "fideism," "confessionalism," and "ghetto," are 
farthest from the truth. 
Not as a detour but as an apt illustration, it may help to look more closely 
at one example from among those inapt characterizations. The "ghetto" in 
European experience was not a place into which Jews chose to retreat, in 
order to be safe or to be kosher, or because Gentiles could not understand 
them. The ghetto-dwellers did have a language of their own-two of them, 
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in fact, one to read their scriptures and one for family life-but they also 
spoke the italian, the german, or the polish of the city around them. They 
spoke it well enough to do business and to represent a cultural challenge. By 
the third generation in a new host setting they spoke the gentiles' language 
well enough to serve the host culture as scribes, doctors, and traders, even 
though they still lived in the ghetto. 
It was the gentile establishment, not Jewry, who walled off the ghetto, to 
defend itself against the cultural threat of the Jews' dissonant, often more 
energetic and more creative life style. We may take that as a sort of unin-
tended parable of our problem. Something similar is true, mostly though not 
always, of the Christian minorities called "sectarian" by establishment theo-
logians. 16 The centuries-long exclusion of minority Christians from civil in-
volvement and from the university has been the result not of the free churches' 
seeking isolation, or of their running away from ambiguity, but of their being 
excluded, by custom and law, at the insistence and in the interest of the 
dominant churches. That lasted until Roger Williams and William Penn dem-
onstrated another possibility, namely that despite (or in fact thanks to) their 
"minority" status and their dissident, non-coercive ethic, they could provide 
decisive social and even political leadership. 
We can set aside, therefore, as counterfactual, efforts to characterize from 
outside someone else's view as being a priori incapable of communication. 
We should rather ask what in principle are the logical and linguistic condi-
tions of the communicability of "news," which is always community-condi-
tioned, to a given receptor culture, which is always outside of that community 
conditioning. 
This question cannot be asked about the world as a whole; there is no 
"world as a whole." There is not even a single "modem secular culture" to 
speak to. This is therefore an empirical question, needing to be asked and 
answered each time locally. It cannot be answered by a merely mental move 
of redefinition, dilution, distillation, or translation, made outside the concrete 
encounter between message-bearers and receptors. 
That news should be accredited as "good" by a receptor culture requires 
first that it be present there, in forms which make sense there. The first words 
of one of the apostolic documents called "Gospel" said it most formally: "the 
Logos became flesh and camped among us." Evangel has to submit-wants 
to submit-vulnerably to the conditions of meaning of the receptor culture. 
We believe "news" when we hear it because those who tell it know whereof 
they tell. They are accredited by their status as witnesses, not because we run 
their report through our a priori grid. 
The Logos dwelt in a tent, not in a castle, nor in a self-contained motor 
home fabricated elsewhere. If the Logos had not chosen this kenosis, there 
would have been no message received. In so doing the Logos does not become 
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less authentically itself; for to impart meaning is the nature of Logos. Again 
there is no null-sum choice between identity and communication. 
What accredits news as "good" is that it enables or even commands a 
wholeness or fullness, a validation or a flourishing, not actualized in its 
absence. It cannot be imposed by authority, or coercively. It is rendered null 
when assent is imposed. Nor can it be esoteric, reserved for specially inducted 
hearers. 
The reasons which count to move hearers to accept the "news" as "good" 
cannot already be provided by "public and shared criteria" already present in 
every culture, for then no news would be needed, or possible. Nor can they 
be stipulated from outside the setting by the bearer of the message. The 
"reasons which count" are present in the intrasubjective communication set-
ting, by virtue of the fact that the news bearers have entered the scene, sub-
mitting to the language of the host culture, articulating and incarnating their 
values in the neighbors' terms. That vulnerability to the host community's 
criteria is the courage of the witness. 
I have not bypassed the problem of validation, nor made it simpler, by this 
description. I have shown that it is multidimensional, but this complexity is 
more true, and my phrasing of the meaning of validity more adequate, than 
Gustafson's simpler picture. 
In the setting as thus described, we must then put a threefold question about 
valid communication: 
-is the content of what is "said" in the new setting faithful to its origin? 
This is like a fuller form of asking whether a proposition is "true"; 
-is the transition into the "flesh" of the receptor culture accurate? This is 
like checking the accuracy of translation from one language to another. No 
two sentences in two languages can be absolutely identical, but a translation 
can be adequate l7 ; 
-is the "enfleshment" in the host setting authentic, non-imperial, uncoerced? 
The Fourth "Good News" author fixed the parameters of this validation in 
terms of the host setting, by saying of the Logos "he came into his own" or 
"he came to his own people." The bearers of good news do not concede that 
the new setting they enter is alien. They do not let gnosticism in the first 
century or Gustofson in ours stipulate that in addressing their neighbors they 
are out of their league. They claim even worlds yet unreached as part of the 
Logos' creation. That claim encompasses even the rebellious powers-to mix 
metaphors and apostles-under whose dominion humankind currently suffers. 
The "news" is not public only in a formal sense: its substance as well is of 
the ordinary world, not mysterious. Jesus announces in God's name that new 
ways of handling money, power, status, and enemies-all public, political 
agenda-will henceforth be possible and will be demanded because God's 
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rule is now real. This is not privileged information about the inner workings 
of the Godhead, not about essences or emanations, nor insider secrets about 
the soul. The news is about a man leading a social movement, out in the open, 
which so threatens the authorities that he is killed-a response no gnostic 
secret could have had-yet his movement goes on. It culminated a people-
building story as old as Abraham, in whose name all the nations are to be 
blessed. 
Yet what Jesus said and represented in that common language was coun-
terintuitive, subversive, and costly. He demanded of his hearers a response 
of metanoia and a new start in another direction. Yet it was neither esoteric 
nor hard to understand. 
The Word's "coming to his own" cannot be triumphal. "His own did not 
receive him," the same author went on to write. The creatures are free to 
rebel. The workers in the vineyard are free to kill the heir. Jesus makes on 
his hearers' assent no claims but by the truth inherent in his words and his 
being there at their mercy. Rejection, according to the "news" brought by 
Jesus and his witnesses, is part of validation. This is where the 
foundationalists cannot follow. They want to tailor their message for a "world 
out there" which they trust will be willing to and will in fact have to listen, 
reasonably, as long as our tongue is not alien or odd. The Good News of the 
Logos, on the other hand, accepts as the price of its communicability that it 
must suffer at the hands of the addresses. Readiness to bear their hostility is 
part of the message. IS 
One way to understand the hankering for a way around particularity with 
which we began is the cultural memory of the privileged status of establish-
ment. Since Augustine called on Caesar to bring the Donatists back into the 
fold, the ability to impose assent was assumed to be a mark of the truth. Only 
grudgingly have the leaders of Christendom yielded their ability to coerce. 
The constructive theologians of our academic establishment would be horri-
fied by the notion of assent's being imposed by the state; yet their definitional 
moves still project the assumption that they want to be able so to restate the 
claims for belief that every reasonable reader will have no choice but to agree. 
The backing of the civil arm, which was not working anyway, has been 
renounced; yet one still wants one's affirmations not be vulnerable to dissent. 
Any such announcement is subject to diversities of appropriation within 
history. When the early Christians gave currency to the label "good news" as 
designating a genre of literature, many such texts were circulating. Numerous 
were judged edifying; finally four were canonized. Particularity and pluralism 
are thus from the outset not an embarrassment but part of being historical. 
There is no way some one set of neutral public criteria could bypass this, or 
should want to. 
Evangel must then include a component of diversity, critique and conflict, 
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not by accident or inadvertence or error, or bad manners, but by the nature 
of things. It will unmask idols. It will demythify the claim of any community 
of meaning to speak for the whole of humanity. Every "wider world" we can 
find is smaller than the globe, smaller than it claims to be. Every self-styled 
speaker for a new age is elitist, every self-styled liberator is oppressive, every 
one of the Powers is rebellious. The idea that "theology should resist the 
clamor ... for what is currently fashionable and immediately intelligible," 
which Gustafson cites with such repugnance from George Lindbeck, is the 
dictate of simple honesty. It is also what Gustafson does when some "current 
fashion" does not convince him. 
My above description of formal criteria for "news" has bypassed the sim-
plest descriptive answer. What it means for "news" to be accredited as "good" 
is first, functionally, defined by the fact that when some witness speaks it 
someone else hears it, and assents to it, joining the community which bears it. 
"Those who received him he empowered to become God's children." With-
out leaving their own world, the addressees enter the community of the 
witnesses who first had crossed the border in the other direction. Each world 
expands to encompass part of the other. The empowerment for this new 
community comes neither from those receivers' having fled their own world 
nor from the witnesses' having annexed it. Nor is it derived from the 
witnesses' having obtained correct information about how to modify their 
message in order to approach the receptor world. What "they who received 
Him" (in the next sentence John slips from the third person to the first) have 
received is not an epistle, nor a line of argument. It is the simple historical 
presence of Logos himself enfleshed in their (our) midst, so that they could 
let their story be incorporated in his. 
Once come into the world, once enfleshed, the "true light that enlightens 
everyone" was utterly and irrevocably particular. The Prologue to the Fourth 
Gospel blends without transition from the entire cosmos into something as 
incorrigibly local, particular as the baptism of John. Yet it is wrong to ask 
how it was or is or should be "distinctive," as did Gustafson's quote from 
MacIntyre above. To make "distinctiveness" a value criterion is to measure 
the truth value of meaning system A in terms of the other systems (whether 
B or C or N or X) that happen to be around, from which is supposed to differ. 
That is a method mistake. Some of the neighboring systems may be very 
much like it. Some of them may be historically derived from it, which is true 
of most of the post-Christian value systems in the West. To ask that Christian 
thought be unique is nonsense. What we should ask of Christian statements 
is that they be specifically or specifiably Christian, i.e., true to kind, authen-
tically representing their species. Whether a specifiably Christian statement 
is "distinctive" depends on the other guy. That cannot be made a criterion of 
authenticity. 
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"God is not a Christian God for Christians only," Gustafson concluded his 
"anti-sectarian" paper, as if that were an argument on his side. That is what 
the first Evangelists were saying: the Logos that has become particular (sarx) 
in Jesus is the light that illuminates everyone. I have been saying that Evan-
gel, by presenting an answer sui generis to the challenge of validation, refutes 
the disjunction between integrity and intelligibility; each is the other's pre-
requisite. Now I must proceed to deny as well the related disjuction between 
the particular and universal. Evangel is by definition, not by coincidence or 
fluke, the alternative to the epistemology of establishment, which seeks to 
adjust one's "own" knowledge to the conditions of validity already dominat-
ing the "wider world." Evangel refutes, not by methodological manipulation or 
sleight of hand but by its irreducible presence and its historical track record, the 
notion that a thinner message would carry farther, or that concern for intelligi-
bility would be best served by an a priori readiness to have less to say. 
The ground for the transcultural intelligibility of the meaning of Jesus is 
not an a priori semantic move made by methodologically preoccupied intel-
lectuals (or apologetically concerned missionaries, for that matter). It is a set 
of first century events, which some of its interpreters call Incarnation. "In-
carnation" is not first a concept in communication theory; it is the code word 
for the uniquely theocentric palestinian jewish man Jesus, communicating 
God to us. 
The above exposition should suffice to make my argument clear. If the 
argument is valid, it opens up two other important derivative questions, which 
I here note as a sort of afterword. To name them, though I shall not pursue 
them, may clarify my point. 
On one hand, so to speak "behind" us, there is the ontological problem. 
Does an epistemology of Evangel presuppose some specific (remember that 
it need not be distinctive) understanding of what Kind of God can thus reveal 
himself? Of course it must, somehow. For some systems of thought God is 
ineffable, and for others He (or She, or It) is self-evident. In the former case 
no evangel would be possible and in the latter none would be needed. This 
question would lead us to review the classical trinitarian debates and the high 
scholastic discussions of communicable versus incommunicable attributes. 
HistoricalloyaIty to the old narrators and prophets who caB God JHWH, and 
to Jesus who told his followers to call him ABBA, might very well create 
problems for some of the depersonalizing and departicularizing moves being 
proposed today in the name of "construction" or "progress. "19 
Yet that is not a new or an alien challenge. To meet that kind of challenge 
is intrinsic to the evangelical claim, and the apostolic witnesses met it 
repeatedly from the very start. The canonical NT contains at least five 
extensive passages testifying to how they handled it, already in the first two 
generations; 
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John 1: 1-14: Jesus and the Logos cosmology; 
Hebrews 1:1-2:18: Jesus and the angels; 
Colossians I: 15-2:23: Jesus and religious cosmology; 
Rev 4: 1-5:4: Jesus and the scroll of destiny; 
Phil 2:1-13: Jesus and the pride of Adam/Prometheus. 
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Five authors, in five languages, five settings, addressing five host cultures, 
took on the challenge of a new world and proclaimed Jesus' sovereignty. They 
did not flee the encounter with their contemporary world's version of process 
ontology; not did they grant that it represented a "wider world" whose stan-
dards they had to kowtow to. They rather faced its challenge, assumed its 
language, and swallowed it up, transcended it.20 
The evangelical strategy does not accept being walled into a ghetto by the 
outside world. Not only does it accept the language of the environs: it seizes 
it, expropriates it, and uses it to say things that could previously not have 
been said in its prior language; nor could they have been said by anyone else 
using the wider world's language. It proclaims the God of Abraham as no 
less the God of the philosophers; it does so not by filtering abrahamic lan-
guage through philosophical funnels, but by pre-empting the philosophers' 
language in order to say with it things they had thought could not be said. It 
refuses to be submitted for validation to the canons of intelligibility or cred-
ibility that were in force before it happened. 
On the other hand, "before" us so to speak, there lies the apologetic prob-
lem. What it is that makes people believe, once the witness is en fleshed in 
their midst? What counts as a warrant to convince them of whatever it is that 
they come to believe? Or for that matter, what is it that people need to come 
to believe? Is there one indispensable propositional content? One indispens-
able existential or emotional experience? 
My above description of the phenomenon of evangel was intentionally 
formal, social. I have discussed neither how much creedal substance, how 
many information bits about God and the world need to be transmitted, nor 
what it is that moves people to say "yes" to that. These questions matter, but 
they are not the place to start. 
It will be no surprise that to these questions too my short answer must be 
that the responses will and must be empirical and particular. There is no 
reason that for all possible addressees the reasons for joining the Jesus move-
ment should have been (in fact) or should need (in principle) to be the same.21 
This is not the place to itemize the varieties of social and psychological 
motivations which were in fact effective in moving people to membership in 
the early messianic synagogues. All that should be needed for present pur-
poses is to clarify two observations. 
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One is that the model of "validation" we are most used to thinking about, 
that of intellectuals coming to be convinced of the truth of propositions in 
God language, on the basis of rational appeal to generalizable warrants, was 
not dominant most of the time in the first centuries of the apostolic enterprise, 
nor has it been since then. 22 People joined the movement for all kinds of 
reasons, and they explained it in numerous ways. 
The other observation is that that was all right. There is nothing embarrass-
ing for the bearer of evangel-as there is for scholastics-about the pluralism 
of styles, modes, and grounds of either proclamation or conversion. It is part 
of the nature of Evangel not only to speak many languages but to enter history 
and the soul through more than one door.23 What needs to be tested is the 
congruence between the shape of believing, and of believing speech and 
believing behavior, in new times and places, and what it had meant before. 
To test that congruence is a task for the multiple roles of leaders and servants 
in the discerning community.24 
There are wrong reasons for joining the movement, and there are truly false 
ideas, "heresy," by these must be denounced and evaluated holistically, in a 
congregational/conversational process, from within the meaning of the wit-
ness, not extrinsically in terms of some autonomously apologetic logic. The 
procedures of evaluation come after, not before, assent. They operate within 
the community's story, not from Athens or "from nowhere." 
Neither of these still open questions, neither the "ontological" one "behind" 
the bearing of good news, nor the "rhetorical" one "ahead" of the witnesses, 
is intrinsically intractable. Neither needs as far as I can see to be resolved 
before my argument can stand. The argument is simply that the dominant 
post-enlightenment disjunction between intelligibility and validity is belied 
by the undeniable historical reality of good news being borne from one world 
to another. If the post-enlightenment epistemological grid should continue to 
refuse to admit this category, that calls into question not the historical reality 
but the grid. 
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